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Within this line of reasoning and into this pattern of decisions the
Court has placed the Rochin case. Although lacking the predictability
which the minority would like to give to the law of search and seizure, 84
the majority decision would seem to be preferred to one pin-pointed to a
specific constitutional guaranty.8 5 Its flexibility leaves the way open for
the advance of medical science in the field of more accurate crime detection. 36 It appears that a more satisfactory result will be reached since
each revolutionary detective device is likely to be tested constitutionally
as it is used in securing evidence. Due process, as thus defined, sets an
outside limit within which officers may work, but at the same time does
not fetter them with power so closely defined as to make it incapable of
beneficial use.
Contrary to the impression left by the press in reporting this decision, 37 stomach pumping is not declared to be an unreasonable search
and seizure in state courts, nor must such evidence illegally obtained be
excluded from state trials. The decision holds only that on the combined
facts of this case, viz., the illegal entry into the defendant's room, the
assault and battery there, and the further assault, battery, and torture
at the hospital, the accused had been denied due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is believed that out of this
and future decisions in similar situations, each of which will be decided
on its individual facts, will come a flexible and practicable body of law
on the admission of evidence gathered by modern medical devices.
JAMES D. BLOUNT, JR.
Contracts-Statute of Frauds-Recovery of Payments by Vendee
Contrary to most jurisdictions, the North Carolina Supreme Court
has consistently carried out the original purpose of the statute of frauds
relating to land by refusing to give effect to land contracts which are not
in writing or which are not signed by the party charged therewith. 1 This
is clearly illustrated by the fact that it is one of only four courts in the
United States which does not recognize the part performance exception
Frankfurter concurring). "We ultimately rely, not upon courts of law, but upon
the convictions, the habits, and the actions of the community." Curtis, Due, and
Democratic, Process of Law, 1944 Wisc. L. REv. 39 at 52.
"' To base this decision on the Fifth Amendment would result in "an unequivocal, definite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal courts." People v.
Rochin, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 213 (1952).
Note, 13 D rIoiT L. REv. 220 (1950).
See, Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191 (1939) ; Note, 36 J. Cailm. L. 132 (1945);
Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 302 (1952).
" See note 1 supra.
1 "All contracts to sell or convey any lands . . . shall be void unless said contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or by some person by him thereto lawfully authorized." N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-2 (1943).
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to the statute. While specific performance is denied,3 recovery for
benefits conferred pursuant to oral contracts failing to meet the statutory
requirements is allowed in order to prevent unjust enrichment. 4 The
legislative intent favoring a strict application of the statute is illustrated
by G. S. 22-2, 5 which provides that contracts falling within the statute
"shall be void," whereas the original English Statute of Frauds was
merely to the effect that "no action shall be brought" on contracts falling
within its purview.0
A deviation from this strict attitude is found in the recent case of
Rochlin v. West Construction Company,7 involving an oral contract
under which defendant was to construct a house and convey the house
and lot to plaintiff. Pursuant to the agreement the vendee paid $1000
in advance. Upon tender of the deed, a dispute arose as to the amount
of the purchase price, and the transaction was never consummated.
Vendee sought to recover the money paid and the vendor claimed the
right to retain the $1000 as damages for failure of the vendee to perform.
The trial court excluded all evidence of the contract, but the supreme
court reversed, saying that the evidence should be admitted, and if the
terms were as claimed by the vendee then the money was to be recovered,
but if as alleged by the vendor then he should retain the $1000.
The decision is in accord with prior North Carolina cases 8 and with
the weight of authority 9 in following the general rule that where a vendee has made payments under a contract which fails to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, he may not recover them if the vendor is.
willing and able to perform the contract. Despite the statutory provision
that a contract for the sale of land is void unless signed by the party to
be charged,O the North Carolina court has held such a contract in parol
2

See Note, 101 A. L. R. 944 (1936).

"The doctrine of part performance has

no place in our jurisprudence and will not dispense with the necessity of a writing."

Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 366, 171 S.E. 331, 333 (1933).
'Ballard v. Boyette, 177 N. C. 24, 86 S. E. 175 (1915) ; Hall v. Misenheimer,
137 N. C. 183, 49 S.E. 104 (1904); Barnes v. Teague, 54 N. C. 278 (1854);
riummer v. Adm'r of Owens, 45 N. C. 254 (1852) ; Allen v. Chambers, 39 N. C.
125 (1845).
' Carter v. Carter, 182 N. C. 186, 108 S. E. 765 (1921) ; Bullard v. Boyette, 171
N. C. 24, 86 S. E. 175 (1915) ; Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64 S. E. 1 (1909) ;
Johnson v. Armfield, 130 N. C. 575, 41 S. E. 705 (1902) ; North v. Bunn, 128 N. C.
196, 38 S. E. 814 (1901) ; Vick v. Vick, 126 N C. 123, 35 S. E. 257 (1900) ; Wilkie
v. Womble, 90 N. C. 254 (1883) ; Barnes v. Brown, 71 N. C. 508 (1874); Capps
v. Holt, 58 N. C. 153 (1859) ; Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858) ; Chambers

v. Massey, 42 N. C. 286 (1851).
'See note 1 supra.
' Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 11, c. 3. Practically all American statutes of frauds

have followed this form, with only a few states providing that contracts failing to
meet the statutory requirements are to be void. 49 AM. JIUR. 872 (1943).
7234

N. C. 443, 67 S.E. 2d 464 (1951).

'Durham Consol. Land & Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N. C. 383, 21 S. E.

952 (1895) ; Syme, Adm'r v. Smith, Adm'r, 92 N. C. 338 (1884) ; Green v. N. C.
R.R., 77 N. C. 95 (1877) ; Foust v. Shoffner, 62 N. C. 242 (1860).
'See Notes, 169 A. L. R. 187 (1947) ; 1916 D L. R. A. 468.
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-2 (1943).
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to be voidable only, and valid unless repudiated by the party to be
charged.1 1 Following this construction, the repudiating party who avails
himself of the statute is left in the position in which he finds himself at
the time of repudiation and can recover no payments made pursuant to
the contract. 12 While there is a possible distinction between the case at
hand and prior North Carolina cases in point,1 3 in that in those cases
the terms of the contract were not in dispute, it is obvious that parol
evidence of the contract and of benefits conferred because of it must be
admitted, or the vendor could end the action on the pleadings by simply
denying the contract or pleading a different one. 14 In those jurisdictions
which adhere to the minority view and allow a recovery of any benefits
conferred upon the other party regardless of who repudiates the contract, the basis for the decisions has been: (1) That the contract is void
and consequently neither party may retain benefits received because of
it,15 or (2) that regardless of the wording of the statute, if there can be
no specific performance decreed, a recovery may be had so as to place
the parties in the status quo.' 6
" "The contracts entered into in compliance with this section are not void but
voidable merely at the instance of the party to be charged. And when such party
takes advantage of the provisions of the statute, he repudiates the contract in its
entirety, and cannot derive any benefit from it." Durham Consol. Land and Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N. C. 381, 384, 21 S. E. 952, 953 (1895). McCall v.
Textile Industrial Institute, 189 N. C. 775, 128 S. E. 349 (1925).
" But this does not prevent an action against the repudiator for benefits conferred upon him. In Durham Consol. Land and Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116
N. C. 381, 21 S. E. 952 (1895), the vendee took possession under a contract
failing to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, and cut timber upon the
land. Vendee then refused to perform and abandoned the land. In a suit by the
vendee to recover the deposit paid, the court allowed the vendor to retain the
amount paid as well as recover damages by way of a counter-claim for the value
of the timber cut. The court stated that the contract was admitted and that so
long as it existed, plaintiff could not rely on the common counts. But cf. Davis v.
Lovick, 226 N. C. 252, 37 S. E. 2d 680 (1946), where the owner sought ejectment
against a tennant, who pleaded as a defense an oral lease contract to extend for
the owner's life. The plaintiff admitted the contract in the reply, but pleaded the
statute of frauds. The court held that the parol contract was not a necessary basis
for the relief sought, and because it was invalid under the statute of frauds, plaintiff was entitled to the ejectment.
13 See note 8 supra.
"The court has admitted parol evidence under similar circumstances. Perry v.
Norton, 182 N. C. 585, 109 S. E. 644 (1921) ; Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64
S. E. 1 (1909) ; Love v. Atkinson, 131 N. C. 544, 42 S. E. 966 (1902) ; Luton v.
Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37 S. E. 143 (1900). The parol evidence may not be introduced in order to establish the contract for the purpose of securing specific performance, but only for the purpose of determining whether the vendee is entitled to
recover the amount he has paid under such agreement. Rochlin v. West Construction Co., 234 N. C. 443, 67 S. E. 2d 464 (1951).
"Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S. D. 1, 242 N. W. 592 (1932), where the court stated
that all jurisdictions which follow the majority rule have a statute which does not
expressly make, or has not been interpreted as making, contracts within its terms
void, rather than voidable. Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142 (1860), where the
court says that the majority rule should prevail where the original English statute
is in force, but where the statute declares such contracts void, the minority rule
should apply. Merten v. Koester, 199 Wis. 79, 225 N. W. 750 (1929).
'"Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. & Improv. Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 So. 695 (1892) ; Burks
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In the Rochlin case the vendor has conferred no benefits upon the
vendee, and in no event could he be made subject to a decree of specific
performance. Were the house to increase in value, the vendor could
return the deposit and sell to a higher bidder, and the vendee could
neither enforce the contract specifically nor recover damages. To allow
a retention of the deposit in this situation would, in effect, be awarding
damages for breach of an agreement declared void by the statute, 17 and
would be treating the contract as if the statute read "no action shall be
brought .... " In view of the court's non-recognition of the part performance doctrine and the fact that the North Carolina statute of frauds
provides that such a contract as that in the principal case is void, it
would seem that application of the minority rule, to allow the vendee to
recover the payment made without the necessity of proving the disputed
terms of the contract, would better serve the purpose of the statute and
would be more consistent with the effect of its prior application.' 8
S. DEAN HAMRICIC.
Criminal Law-Convicts--Commencement of Sentence*
In North Carolina, a prisoner sentenced to the state prison system
does not begin to serve his sentence until he is actually received from the
county jail.' In a majority of the states where the issue has been decided
in the absence of a controlling statute, a sentence is -deemed to begin on
the date when it is pronounced. 2 When the defendant is not in custody
v. Douglas, 156 Ky. 462, 161 S. W. 225 (1913) (although prior Kentucky cases
followed the majority rule) ; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418 (1873) ; Brown v. Pol-

lard, 89 Va. 695, 17 S. E. 6 (1893).
'In
Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9, 10 (1838), the court stated: "We admit this
objection [the statute of frauds] to be well founded, and we hold as a consequence
from it that the contract being void, not only its specific performance cannot be
enforced, but that no action will lie in law or equity, for damages because of nonperformance."
8 Of course, the vendor should be allowed to off-set any benefits he has conferred upon the vendee, such as reasonable rental value if vendee has been in possession of the property.
* This material was prepared during the summer of 1951 while the author was
serving as a member of the staff of the Institute of. Government. It is part of a
forthcoming guidebook for prison officials to be published by the Institute.
'This is not a statutory rule, nor are there any case decisions or rulings of the
attorney-general to support it. According to the attorneys for the prison department, this has been the administrative policy since the state took over the county
road camp system in 1933.
2
Alexander v. Posey, 32 Ala. App. 494, 27 So. 2d 237 (1946) ; State v. Nichols,
167 Kan. 565, 207 P. 2d 469 (1949) ; Harding v. State Bd. of Parole, 307 Mass.
217, 29 N. E. 2d 756 (1940) ; Braxton v. State, 103 Miss. 127, 60 So. 66 (1912) ;
Commonwealth ex tel. Lerner v. Smith, 151 Pa. Super. 265, 30 A. 2d 347 (1943)
(stating general rule, although controlled by statute adopting the minority view) ;
State ex rel. Plumb v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 510, 166 P. 2d 188 (1946) ; 15
Am. Jura. 110 (1951). Contra: Gorovitz v. Sartain, 1 F. 2d 602 (N. D. Ga. 1924)
(The court upheld an Atlanta Penitentiary regulation directing that time commenced when a prisoner was received, citing a Georgia statute directing that good
conduct allowances began when a prisoner was received.) ; Clifford v. Maryland,
30 Md. 575 (1869) ; Ex parte Holden, 31 Okla. Cr. 133, 237 P. 622 (1925).

